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This paper evaluates whether microcredit programs such as the popular
Grameen Bank reach the relatively poor and vulnerable in two Bangladeshi
villages. It uses a unique panel dataset with monthly consumption and in-
come data for 229 households before they received loans. We …nd that while
microcredit is successful at reaching the poor, it is less successful at reaching
the vulnerable. Our results also suggest that microcredit is unsuccessful at
reaching the group most prone to destitution, the vulnerable poor. Our
main contribution is to explicitly evaluate the targeting of an anti-poverty
intervention using the e¢cient risk-sharing framework in Townsend (1994).
JEL Codes: O16,I 38,Q 12
Keywords: Poverty, Vulnerability, Microcredit, Targeting, Risk Shar-
ing, Grameen Bank.1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Subsidized credit has a disappointing history of being politically manipulated
and diverted from its intended bene…ciaries, the poor. Instead the rich have
bene…ted disproportionately from such programs. For instance, 80 percent of
the $56 million subsidies provided to Costa Rica’s largest bank in 1974 went
to large wealthy farmers (Vogel, 1984). The non-poor were just as likely as
the poor to participate in a Indian government subsidized credit scheme in
the 1980s (Ravallion and Datt, 1995). Yet in recent years, subsidized lend-
ing programs such as the Grameen Bank have become “the world’s hot idea
to reduce poverty (New York Times, 1997).” These “microcredit” schemes
provide small loans without collateral to households excluded by the formal
…nancial sector in many developing countries (Morduch, 1999). While there
have been numerous attempts to assess the impact of these programs on a
variety of outcomes (Pitt and Khandker, 1998a, Morduch, 1998, and oth-
ers), there has been little research on how well targeted modern microcredit
programs actually are.1
This paper uses a unique data set from two villages in Northern Bangladesh
to test if members of microcredit programs are poorer and more vulnerable
than non-members. A household is de…ned as poor if it has low consumption
levels, and vulnerable if it is unable to smooth consumption in the face of
idiosyncratic income ‡uctuations. We use consumption and income data
for 229 households for twelve months in 1991 ¡ 92 to identify households
that are poor and vulnerable. We then check to see which of these house-
holds joined a microcredit program by 1995. Since microcredit organizations
only just began to give loans in the two villages in 1991 ¡ 92,w ec a ni g -
nore issues of endogeneity for the most part. The three programs in our
study, Grameen Bank, Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC)
and Association for Social Advancement (ASA) are the largest microcredit
providers in Bangladesh, and among the largest in the world.
We …nd that modern microcredit programs are de…nitely more successful
at reaching the poor than their predecessors. The probability that a mi-
crocredit member is below the poverty line is substantially higher than that
of a randomly picked household in both villages. A 24 percent decrease
in monthly consumption at the mean increases the probability of joining a
1Navajas et al (1998) and Pitt and Khandker (1998b) are exceptions. Unlike this
paper, they use data on households after they have joined microcredit programs.
1microcredit program by about 6 to 7 percent. In contrast, microcredit is
less successful at reaching the vulnerable. We …nd that the vulnerable are
more likely to join microcredit programs only in the richer of the two villages.
Most crucially, we …nd no evidence that microcredit reaches the households
most in need of assistance, the vulnerable poor. Indeed, our results suggest
that the vulnerable poor are excluded from microcredit in the poorer village.
Many rural households lack insurance against risks of sickness, ‡oods,
crop damage and ‡uctuations in prices. Of these, household-speci…c risks but
not aggregate shocks can be insured against at the village level. We think
of households that are unable to perfectly insure themselves in the event
of household-speci…c shocks as vulnerable. The recent World Development
Report uses a similar de…nition: “vulnerability measures...the likelihood that
the shock will result in a decline in well-being (World Bank, 2001, p.139).”
In principle, both rich and poor households could be labeled as vulnerable
a c c o r d i n gt oo u rm e a s u r e . 2 Our data show that poorer households are more
vulnerable than the rich, however. Reaching the vulnerable poor is con-
sidered to be crucial to any poverty reduction strategy (World Bank, 2001).
Further, protecting the vulnerable poor is an explicit goal of microcredit
practitioners and a means to promote repayment.3 Grameen explicitly bun-
dles insurance with credit provision: borrowers have access to repeat loans
from a disaster fund and a group savings fund when they are hit with an
adverse shock. Impact studies emphasize microcredit’s role in smoothing
consumption (Morduch, 1998, and Pitt and Khandker, 1998a).
The main contribution of this paper is to explicitly evaluate the target-
ing of an anti-poverty intervention using the general equilibrium framework
of risk sharing in village economies (Townsend, 1994). Since the presence
of vulnerable households indicates a market or institutional failure, it can
2There is an issue of semantics here. The inability to perfectly insure against idiosyn-
cratic risk has di¤erent welfare implications for a poor than for a rich household, since the
former is more likely to fall into destitution following an adverse income shock. Therefore,
some readers would no doubt have preferred that we use the term “vulnerable” only for
uninsured poor households and not for uninsured rich households. Since we separately
analyze whether microcredit reaches the poor, the uninsured, and the uninsured poor, we
do (indirectly) address their concern.
3According to Grameen Bank’s deputy managing director: “In view of the vulnerabil-
ities of its targeted clientele, Grameen has carefully built into its credit delivery system
innovative safety features. These act like shock absorbers, enabling Grameen members to
better cope with natural as well as man-made disasters. Without them the credit delivery
system would not have functioned at all... (Shams, 1992, p. 13, emphasis added).”
2be welfare improving to assist the vulnerable, particularly the vulnerable
poor. We compute several alternative vulnerability measures to control for
measurement error and to allow for di¤erent speci…cations of the basic risk
sharing model. Our results on the relationship between vulnerability and
microcredit membership are robust to these alternatives. We also compare
our vulnerability measure to more commonly used measures of consumption
variability, and argue that such measures are inadequate proxies for vulnera-
bility. In contrast to our vulnerability measure, we …nd that rich households
have more variable consumption than the poor.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the two
villages and the data. Section 3 derives a measure of vulnerability and de-
scribes its estimation. Section 4 reports our …ndings on whether microcredit
reaches the poor and vulnerable. Section 5 concludes.
2D a t a
The study uses transactions data collected over 12 months in two villages
(called A and B to preserve anonymity) in the district of Rajshahi in north-
west Bangladesh. Table 1 reports the distribution of occupations within each
village. Village A is primarily agricultural while village B is more diversi-
… e di ni t si n c o m es o u r c e s : o n l y20 percent of the households in village A
but over half the households in village B do not report agriculture or daily
labor as their main occupation. Village B has several small shops, a mar-
ketplace (haat) that meets twice a week and attracts 200 vendors, and local
government o¢ces. All major marketing activities for village A are held in
marketplaces outside the village. Both villages grow three rice crops a year.
In addition, village A grows betel leaf, a cash crop, and village B has several
jointly owned mango orchards (Amin, 1998).
In 1991, there were 395 and 398 households respectively in the two vil-
lages. Of these, 120 households were sampled in each village. Male headed
households had a 1
4 chance of being surveyed, while all female headed house-
holds were sampled. The lack of complete data for a few households brought
the number of units in our sample down to 112 for village A and 117 for
village B. Households were followed for 12 rounds and data on income, ex-
penditure, asset transactions, time use, loans and gifts were collected at each
round.4 Each round corresponds roughly to a calendar month, with rounds
4Resident research teams of 2 male and 2 female interviewers who were recent university
3starting in September 1991 for village A and October 1991 for village B.
Two consumption measures were created for each of the sampled house-
holds over the 12 months: food consumption and all (non-durable) consump-
tion. Food consumption includes consumption from own production of wheat
and rice, purchased wheat and rice, other food purchases (e.g. vegetables
and pulses), other food consumption from own produce, net meals received
as wages or gifts. All consumption adds expenditure on services and other
non-durable purchases (e.g. tobacco and medicines). Measures of household
income and revenue were also created.5 All income includes net pro…ts from
own crop production, net wages earned, net pro…ts from trading, self em-
ployment and business activities, and rent. Revenue comprises gross pro…ts
and wages earned. Neither the all income measure nor the revenue measure
include net borrowing and saving or net gifts received. Each of these are as-
sumed to be smoothing devices used to augment consumption when incomes
are low or to put aside resources when incomes are high. Field observation
and the detailed transactions data indicate that zero nominal interest loans
were common within both villages, and gift exchange in the form of meals
or food was widespread. Table 2 reports summary statistics for the two
villages. The unit of observation is a household. Village B is wealthier than
village A: adult equivalent monthly consumption, income, and revenues are
all higher in B. The mean adult equivalent monthly income is 429 taka (ap-
proximately $11) in village A and 537 taka in village B (approximately $14
using the 1992 exchange rate of $1 = 38 taka). The daily agricultural wage
in both villages in 1991 ¡ 92 was 20 taka plus two meals, valued at about
7 taka each. So a day’s agricultural work was worth less than $1.S i n c e
the coe¢cient of variation of consumption is lower than that of income or
revenues for both villages, there appears to be some risk sharing by house-
holds. There is considerable idiosyncratic (and hence diversi…able) risk in
this economy: incomes and revenue do not comove across households.
graduates lived in each village between June 1991 and November 1992. The principal
investigator spent approximately one week every month in the villages to supervise and
participate in data collection.
5Consumption, income and revenue are in per adult equivalent terms throughout the
paper. The following age-sex weights were used: 1:0 for adult males, 0:9 for adult females,
0:94 for males aged 13¡18, 0:83 for females aged 13¡18, 0:67 for children aged 7¡12, 0:52
for children aged 4 ¡ 6; 0:32 for toddlers aged 1 ¡ 3; and 0:05 for infants. These weights
are the same as those used by Townsend (1994) which are based on a south Indian dietary
survey.
4Wodon (1997) calculates a poverty line of 425 taka monthly per capita
consumption for Rajshahi for 1991¡92 using the cost of basic needs method.6
According to his estimates, 62 percent of rural Rajshahi and 47 percent of
rural Bangladesh is below the poverty line. Village A is slightly poorer than
the average Rajshahi village: 68 percent of the sampled households are below
the poverty line. On the other hand, village B is slightly richer than the
average Rajshahi village but still poor relative to the national average: 54
percent of its sampled households are below the poverty line.7
A resurvey of both these villages was carried out in 1995.I np a r t i c u l a r ,
we have information on the number of households (or their splits) that had
joined Grameen, BRAC and ASA by 1995.8 This is the unique feature of
the data that we exploit in our analysis. In 1991¡92, when the …rst survey
was conducted, Grameen Bank had only begun to establish their presence
in the two villages. In village A, 5 sampled households took their …rst loans
from Grameen before the end of the survey in 1992,o fw h i c h2 took loans in
the last two months of the survey. In village B, 14 sampled households took
Grameen loans before the end of the survey in 1992,o fw h i c h4 households
took loans in the last quarter of the survey.9 By 1995,G r a m e e n ,B R A Ca n d
ASA had …rmly established their loan program in these villages. Throughout
this paper, consumption and income data (and therefore our measures of
vulnerability) are based on the 1991 ¡ 92 data. Microcredit membership
data, on the other hand, are derived from the 1995 resurvey. A household’s
average consumption level and vulnerability may of course change between
1991 ¡ 92 and the year just before it joined a microcredit program, but
we have no data for the intervening period to control for this possibility.
However, once a microcredit program begins lending in an area it expands
quickly and other microcredit programs follow soon after. So it is likely that
households that joined microcredit programs did so soon after the 1991¡92
6The poverty line was set by computing the (district speci…c) cost of a food basket that
enabled households to meet the normative nutritional requirement of 2:5 kilocalories, and
adding to this an estimated allowance for non-food consumption.
7The percentages of households below the poverty line have been weighted to re‡ect
the oversampling of female-headed households.
8Households that split between 1992 and 1995 were treated as a single unit. Field
observations suggest that split households maintain very close social and economic ties,
and appear to act as a single large unit.
9For those households that had already joined Grameen before the end of the survey
our estimates of poverty and vulnerability levels may be biased by the loans taken from
Grameen. We discuss the likely direction of such bias, wherever applicable, in Section 4.
5data was collected.
Table 3 summarizes the village composition in terms of several household
categories (landlessness, female headship, education level of the household
head).10 In addition, the number of households with at least one microcredit
member by 1995 is reported. About one third of all sampled households
in each village had joined a microcredit program by this time. Grameen
membership had risen to 10 sampled households in village A and 17 sampled
households in village B; and total microcredit membership was 38 sampled
households in each village.
Microcredit loan use is typically quite fungible. So even though the loans
are sometimes given for production, they can be diverted for consumption
smoothing. Todd (1996) describes how paddy husking and the purchase of
cows are commonly reported uses of Grameen loans, but in practice loans
are often used to lease land and repay other loans (a consumption smoothing
activity).
3 Measuring vulnerability
Under commonly made assumptions (separability of consumption and leisure,
common rates of time preference, additively separable preferences over time)
e¢cient risk sharing within a village implies that household consumption
should move only with aggregate consumption and not with household in-
come (Deaton, 1997, pages 372 ¡ 383; and Townsend, 1994). We measure
vulnerability based on this risk sharing test. Instead of looking at speci…c
smoothing mechanisms (such as loans, gifts, savings or asset sales), vulner-
ability is derived from household outcomes (consumption and income). In
this Section we describe how we estimate a baseline vulnerability measure for
each household and propose alternative vulnerability measures to study its
robustness. We also report on the correlation of vulnerability with poverty
and with measures of the variability of consumption.
10In regressions of household average monthly (all) consumption on household charac-
teristics, we found that female headed and larger households, and households with less
arable land and more elderly members had lower consumption in both villages.
63.1 Risk Sharing
A key feature of e¢cient risk sharing within the village is that changes in log
marginal utility of consumption must be equated across households at each



























t denotes consumption for household h at time t; nh
t is the (age-sex
adjusted) number of male adult equivalents in the household at time t, ³
h
t is
a preference shock and ¾ is the coe¢cient of absolute risk aversion. E¢cient

















where ¢xt ´ xt ¡ xt¡1 for any variable xt,a n d·t is the …rst di¤erence
in logarithms of the appropriately discounted multiplier associated with the
aggregate resource constraint. So consumption across agents should comove
(modulo variations due to preference shocks), and changes in a household’s
consumption should not be a¤ected by changes in that household’s income.
Equation (1) constitutes the basis of our estimation strategy. If full risk-
sharing is in place and preference shocks can be treated as mean zero error
terms that are uncorrelated with changes in income and with time dummies,
then changes in per-adult-equivalent consumption over time should comove
across households. Household consumption should only be a¤ected by ag-
gregate ‡uctuations in the village, and not by idiosyncratic shocks to the
household’s own income or resources. Our estimation strategy focuses on
identifying individual households within each village that are vulnerable to
idiosyncratic risk.
So far we have implicitly assumed that the household utility stays the
same if one doubles both the total consumption in the household and the
number of adult equivalents. But a bigger household may be more e¢cient.
First di¤erencing consumption will eliminate economies of scale that are …xed
through time, however. Only 3 households in village A and 2 in village B
change composition during the 12 months of the sample, so we can safely
ignore household economies of scale.
73.2 Estimation
We estimate a linear regression model based on equation (1) to identify vul-
nerable households. If we treat the ³
h
t preference shocks as mean zero error
terms that are uncorrelated with the other regressors, equation (1) suggests












t denotes per-adult-male equivalent consumption of house-
hold h in month t, e yh
t is (per-adult-equivalent) household income at time t,
and MDt is a month dummy, that equals one for observations at time t,
zero otherwise. The coe¢cient Át captures 1
¾·t from equation (1), which is
proportional to a measure of the aggregate resource constraint at date t.T h e
error term "h
t is assumed to be uncorrelated with the right hand side variables
and to be mean zero. We assume the following covariance structure:
1. ¿2
ht ´ Va r("h
t)=¿2
h 8 h; t;
2. ¿h;ts ´ Cov("h
t;" h
s)=0 8 h; t 6= s;
3. ¿hk;ts ´ Cov("h
t;" k
s)=0 8 h 6= k; t 6= s;
4. ¿hk;t ´ Cov("h
t;" k
t)=0 8 t; h 6= k.
The …rst assumption on heteroskedasticity is motivated by the results of
several tests (such as the White general test and the Glesjer test based on
the regression of the squared residuals on several household variables). In-
tuitively, it seems reasonable to allow the variance of the residuals to vary
across households, since they have very di¤erent sizes, landholdings, con-
sumption and income levels. The other assumptions are quite standard. We
have tested for the presence of contemporaneous correlation across house-
holds using a variety of methods, and we …nd very little evidence, if any, of
such correlation. We estimate (2) via FGLS, postulating that the individ-
ual household variance depends on several observable characteristics (such






The regression equation (2) has been estimated numerous times in the
literature on e¢cient risk sharing, for the special case in which ®h = ® for
8all h. Under the null hypothesis of full risk sharing in the village as a whole,
equation (1) implies that ® must be equal to zero. A signi…cantly positive
estimated coe¢cient b ® implies that the full risk-sharing hypothesis can be
rejected for the village as a whole. Both villages in our dataset fail the full
risk sharing test. For village A, b ® =0 :0366 (with a p-value of 0:005)a n df o r
village B, b ® =0 :0299 (with a p-value of 0:019).
For this paper we are interested in identifying speci…c households for
which the implications of full risk-sharing models are rejected. So we estimate
as e p a r a t e®h parameter for each household h. The baseline regression (2)
is estimated separately for each village. The distribution of the estimates b ®h
a r ed e p i c t e di nF i g u r e1. Nineteen households in village A and 18 in village
B had positive and signi…cant b ®
h using a 10% statistical signi…cance level.11
The mean of the b ®
h estimates is 0:11 in village A and 0:19 in village B.
The theoretical framework only o¤ers a test of whether full risk sharing
holds for a given household. To interpret the size of a signi…cantly positive
vulnerability coe¢cient, we consider autarky with limited savings possibili-
ties as an alternative to the full risk sharing model. Under this alternative,
®h would be positive. As the household moves from full risk sharing to au-
tarky, its ®h parameter will increase.12 Our baseline measure of vulnerability
therefore is the estimated b ®
h.
One may be concerned that the observed income ‡uctuations ¢e yh
t may
just re‡ect seasonal variations that a¤ect the village as a whole (such as
planting and harvest, rainy and dry seasons), and not household-speci…c
shocks. But since such village-wide shocks are controlled for by the month
dummy in the baseline regression (2), our b ®
h estimates detect responses of
household consumption to household-speci…c shocks controlling for village-
wide ‡uctuations. Further, there is substantial household speci…c (and hence
insurable) risk in these economies. The deviations of household income from
the village average are largely uncorrelated across households.
So far we have restricted all agents to have the same coe¢cient of absolute
risk aversion ¾. Our vulnerability estimates from regression (2) may be
biased as a consequence. In particular, our b ®
h estimates may simply re‡ect
individual di¤erences in the attitude towards risk: a less risk averse household
11These numbers fall to 14 and 10 respectively, using a 5% signi…cance level.
12Roughly one quarter of the estimated parameters are negative, but fewer than 6% of
the total are negative at the 10% level. A couple of households in either village have
an estimated vulnerability parameter larger than one. This is presumably because of
measurement error.
9may be associated with a higher b ®
h, whereas a more risk averse household
may exhibit a lower b ®h. If some agents were more or less risk averse than
others, with ¾h denoting household h’s degree of risk aversion, then equation











Suppose the true model were equation (3) but we estimate regression (2)
instead. Then b Át is an estimate of ¡º·t(where º = 1
N
P
h ºh and ºh ´ 1
¾h),
and we have to evaluate the possibility that omitting the term (ºh ¡ º)·t may
bias our b ®
h estimates. Suppose we assume that ºh is uncorrelated with ¢e yh
t ,
since the latter re‡ects idiosyncratic shocks that hit household h which should
be independent of that household’s degree of risk aversion. That implies our
b ®
h estimates from regression (2) will be biased only if there is a non zero
correlation between ¢e yh
t and ·t, i.e. between changes in individual income
and changes in the aggregate resource constraint over time. We proxy for
·t using the change in aggregate consumption. In the data, the correlation
between changes in household income and changes in aggregate consumption
is negligible and statistically insigni…cant for both villages (0:009 in village
A and ¡0:025 in village B). Therefore di¤erences in risk aversion will not
bias our vulnerability estimates.
3.3 Robustness
We estimate several alternatives to the baseline vulnerability measure for
each household:
1. Truncated. The …rst round of data collected in both villages is more
susceptible to measurement error than subsequent rounds because the
enumerators did not have a starting inventory of household grain and
foodstu¤ to go by. Therefore we estimate ®h parameters excluding the
…rst round of data.
2. Medical Expenses. The baseline regression model (2) assumes that
preference shocks are uncorrelated with the other covariates. We also
estimate a version of equation (1) where household speci…c medical
expenditures Xh














10Sickness shocks can reduce a household’s desire to consume, for in-
s t a n c e ,a n dc a nb ec o r r e l a t e dw i t hi n c o m es h o c k s .
3. Female Headship. The baseline regression equation (2) assumes com-
mon risk aversion. While we do not have the degrees of freedom neces-
sary to directly estimate a household speci…c risk aversion coe¢cient,
it is possible to allow the coe¢cient of absolute risk aversion to vary
across groups. Female headship is associated with higher vulnerability
in regressions of our baseline vulnerability measure on household char-
acteristics.13 Therefore, it may be the case that female headed house-
holds are more risk averse than male headed households. A version of
risk sharing implication (1) allowing for the coe¢cient of absolute risk















where F is a Household Dummy that is equal to one if household h is
a female headed and zero otherwise. Therefore assuming, as before,
that preference shocks can be treated as mean zero error terms that are
uncorrelated with the other regressor, we also estimate the following






t + Át ¢ MDt + ÁFt¢ MDt ¢ F + "
h
t (6)
Thus we estimate a Át parameter for male headed households and a
Át + Á1t parameter for female headed households to re‡ect possible
di¤erences in risk aversion between the two.
4. Common Components. Measurement error that is common to con-
sumption and income would bias our vulnerability estimate in equation
(2). There are components of consumption (such as net meals received
as wages and own produce consumed) that are also included as income.
So we exclude these common components from the measure of income
in our estimation of household vulnerability.
13Vulnerability is more elusive than poverty. The adjusted R2 from regressions of
vulnerability on household characteristics were much lower than the adjusted R2 from re-
gressions of average household all consumption on household characteristics. Further, only
female headship in the pooled regression and in the village B regression was signi…cantly
negative, by itself and with controls for other household characteristics.
115. Stronger De…nition. Our baseline vulnerability measure identi…es a
household as vulnerable even if it achieves the “average” level of vul-
nerability for the village as a whole. A stronger de…nition of vulnera-
bility would only consider those households vulnerable who achieve less
insurance than the average in the village. So we construct the follow-
ing measure from the baseline: vulnerability is b ®
h if b ®
h > b ® where b ® is
the village vulnerability co-e¢cient (section 3.2), and vulnerability is 0
otherwise.
6. CRRA utility. To check if our measure of vulnerability is robust to





















































t represents per-adult-equivalent revenues for household h at
month t. We use revenues instead of income because the latter can
sometimes take negative values, while the former cannot. Revenues
proxy for idiosyncratic risk. The distribution of the b ®
h estimates are
shown in Figure 1. Twentysix households had signi…cantly positive b ®h
estimates in village A and 29 households had signi…cantly positive b ®
h
estimates in village B.
Though these six alternative measures of vulnerability are either derived
from di¤erent speci…cations of the baseline model or attempt to control for
measurement error, it is reassuring that the identity of households that have
signi…cantly positive b ®
h estimates remains stable across the alternatives.
With the baseline measure a total of 37 households in both villages have
positive and signi…cant b ®h estimates (at the 10% signi…cance level). With
12t h ef e m a l eh e a d s h i pm e a s u r e ,37 households have positive and signi…cant b ®
h
estimates, and only 2 of those households did not have positive and signi…-
cant b ®
h estimates in the baseline. With the common components measure,
27 households had positive and signi…cant b ®
h estimates, and only 3 of those
households did not have positive and signi…cant b ®h estimates in the baseline.
The pattern is similar for the other alternative vulnerability measures. Con-
sequently we are con…dent that the baseline vulnerability measure is fairly
robust. In what follows, we will present results …rst using the baseline mea-
sure, and then using the alternative measures as a cross-check.
3.4 Vulnerability, Variability and Poverty
As one would perhaps expect, poorer households tend to be more vulnerable
than richer households in our data. Vulnerability is signi…cantly negatively
correlated with consumption using the pooled data and in village B (Table 5).
This …nding is stable across all the alternative vulnerability measures, except
for CRRA measure where the correlation is negative but not signi…cant.
The same pattern emerges from a comparison of the average vulnerability
of households below the poverty line with those above the poverty line in
Table 6. Households below the poverty line have signi…cantly higher average
vulnerability than those above the poverty line for the baseline and half the
alternative vulnerability measures using the pooled data, and for the baseline
and all but one of the alternative vulnerability measures in village B:14
Our measure of vulnerability is quite distinct from measures of consump-
tion variability, such as the coe¢cient of variation (CV) of consumption
or the variance of log consumption.15 The baseline and most alternative
measures of vulnerability are not signi…cantly correlated with either of the
two measures of consumption variability (Table 5). Though poor house-
holds tend to be more vulnerable than the rich, rich households have more
variable consumption than the poor. Household consumption is positively
correlated with the CV of consumption using the pooled data and in village
A for food consumption (Table 5). Households below the poverty line have
a signi…cantly lower CV of consumption than those above the poverty line
in each village (Table 6). Households below the poverty line also have a
signi…cantly lower variance of log consumption than households above the
14Jalan and Ravallion (1999) also …nd that the poor are signi…cantly more vulnerable
than the rich in rural China.
15Morduch (1998) uses the latter as a proxy for household vulnerability.
13poverty line using the pooled data (Table 6). In addition, while consumption
variability may just capture di¤erences in risk aversion across households,
our vulnerability measure is unbiased even when some households are more
risk averse than others, provided the degree of risk aversion is uncorrelated
with shocks to household income (Section 3.2). Consequently for the rest of
the paper we will be concerned with vulnerability and not with consumption
variability.
4R e s u l t s
In this Section we test if households that joined microcredit programs by
1995 were poorer and more vulnerable in 1991¡92 than households that did
not join microcredit programs by 1995: We do this by comparing average
consumption and average vulnerability of members with non-members, test-
ing whether the distribution of consumption and vulnerability of members
…rst order stochastically dominates that of non-members, and by conducting
probit regressions of microcredit membership on consumption, vulnerability
and household characteristics.
4.1 Poverty
There is clear evidence that households that joined microcredit programs by
1995 were poorer in 1991¡92 than those that did not join. The Cumulative
Distribution Functions (CDFs) of average monthly consumption and income
for microcredit members and non-members are shown in Figure 2.I nb o t h
villages, and more so in village B, the distribution for non-members is shifted
to the right. The average monthly consumption for members is signi…cantly
lower than that of non-members using the pooled data, and in both villages
separately (Table 6). In village A average monthly all consumption is 36
taka (approximately $1)l o w e rf o rm e m b e r s ,w h i c hi s 10 percent of the village
average monthly consumption. In village B average monthly all consump-
tion is 88 taka (approximately $2) lower for members, which is 20 percent
of the village average monthly consumption. Correlations between average
monthly consumption and membership are also signi…cantly negative using
the pooled data and in village B and negative but barely insigni…cant in
village A (Table 5).
In addition to just looking at speci…c moments of the distribution of
14consumption of members and non-members, we also use a non parametric
test to check if the distribution of average monthly consumption for non-
members …rst order dominates that for members. This test is based on
Anderson (1996) and is described in more detail in the appendix. The
results in Table 3 show that the distribution of consumption for non-members
signi…cantly …rst order stochastically dominates the distribution for members
using the pooled data and in village B: The test of …rst order stochastic
dominance goes in the same direction, but is barely insigni…cant, in village
A. Thus we have a strong indication that members are poorer than non-
members, since …rst order stochastic dominance implies both second and
third order dominance.
Another way of evaluating the success of microcredit programs in reaching
the poor is by using the poverty line. The proportion of microcredit members
below the poverty line is 79 percent in village A and 74 percent in village
B, which is signi…cantly higher than the proportion of non-members below
the poverty line in both villages (Table 6). The proportion of microcredit
members below the poverty line is also higher than the village averages, the
Rajshahi district average and the national average of 47 percent (see Section
2). Therefore, the probability that a household was below the poverty
line when it received a loan is substantially higher than the probability of a
randomly picked Bangladeshi household being below the poverty line.
A probit regression in table 7 shows that a 100 taka or 24 percent decrease
in monthly consumption at the mean gives a household a 6 or 7 percent
higher probability of receiving a loan on average. This is statistically
signi…cant using the pooled data and in village B conditional on vulnerability
(column 4) and controlling for other household characteristics (column 6).
This is signi…cant for village A controlling for vulnerability (column 4)a n d
signi…cant at the 11% level controlling for other household characteristics
(column 6).
Since one-third of the households that eventually became microcredit
members in village B joined before the end of the twelve rounds of data
collection in 1992, there is the possibility that the loans they received may
have a¤ected the consumption of those households, and thus could bias our
results. Provided loans have a non-negative impact on household consump-
tion, however, such a bias will only strengthen our …nding that microcredit
reaches the poor. Our results may therefore underestimate microcredit’s
e¤ectiveness at reaching the poor in village B:
Finally notice that having more arable land is not signi…cantly associated
15with a lower probability of joining a microcredit program (Table 7 column
3). So that though microcredit does reach the consumption-poor there is no
evidence that it reaches the relatively landless.16
4.2 Vulnerability
There is weak evidence that households that joined microcredit programs by
1995 were more vulnerable in 1991 ¡ 92 than those that did not join. The
Cumulative Distribution Functions (CDFs) of vulnerability for microcredit
members and non-members are shown in Figure 2. Notice that though mem-
bers appear to be more vulnerable in village B; non-members appear to be
more vulnerable in village A: The average vulnerability of members is signif-
icantly higher than that of non-members in village B but not in the pooled
data (Table 6). This is robust to all alternative vulnerability measures ex-
cept for the Common measure, where it is barely insigni…cant. Correlations
between vulnerability and membership are also signi…cantly negative only in
village B but not in the pooled data (Table 5), and this …nding is robust
to alternative vulnerability measures. The results from the non-parametric
tests in Table 4 show that the distribution of vulnerability for members signif-
icantly …rst order stochastically dominates the distribution for non-members
using the pooled data and in village B.
The probit regression in table 7 yields the same pattern across the two
villages (column 1) and again it is robust to most alternative vulnerability
measures. Raising vulnerability by 0:2 at the mean raises the probability of
being a microcredit member by about 3 percent in village B.I n t e r e s t i n g l y ,
vulnerability does not signi…cantly increase a household’s probability of join-
ing if we control for poverty (column 4) and other household characteristics
(column 6). This gives a potential explanation for the di¤erences across
villages: since village B is richer than village A; vulnerable households may
be more likely to join in village B only because they are not as poor.
This result is subject to the following caveat. It seems reasonable to
suppose that microcredit membership either decreases a household’s vulner-
ability or leaves it unaltered. Since a third of the microcredit members in
16Only households with less than half an acre of cultivated land are typically eligible to
join Grameen, BRAC and ASA. Table 3 shows that over half the households that joined
microcredit programs in 1995 did not meet this eligibility criterion in 1991: Since some of
these households may have split or sold land to meet the landholding criterion, this may
be an overestimate of mistargeting.
16village B joined Grameen before the end of the twelve rounds of data col-
lection in 1992, these households may appear less vulnerable than they were
before joining Grameen. Consequently we may underestimate microcredit’s
e¤ectiveness at reaching the vulnerable in village B.
4.3 Interaction
Finally, we wish to check if vulnerable households below the poverty line have
a higher probability of joining microcredit programs than vulnerable house-
holds above the poverty line. We are particularly interested in this since the
vulnerable poor are those that would likely gain the most from gaining ac-
cess to smoothing devices, thus avoiding possible destitution. Therefore, we
introduce an interaction term in the probit regression in Table 7 (column 5).
The coe¢cient on the interaction term is insigni…cant using the pooled data
and in village B. But interestingly, the interaction has a signi…cantly nega-
tive coe¢cient in village A (and the coe¢cient remains signi…cantly negative
when we replace the baseline vulnerability measure with the alternative vul-
nerability measures that use truncated data, control for medical expenses and
exclude common components). For households that are below the poverty
line in village A, raising vulnerability by 0:1 or 9 p e r c e n ta tt h em e a nl o w e r s
the probability of joining a microcredit program by about 2:3 percent, and
this is signi…cant at the 10% level.
So microcredit does not reach the vulnerable poor in the relatively richer
village B, and appears to exclude the vulnerable poor in the poorer village
A: In other words, poor households that do join tend to have better access to
insurance and smoothing devices than those who do not. The vulnerable poor
may either choose not to join or they may be excluded by the microcredit
program. There is some anecdotal evidence consistent with the latter. For
instance, a bank o¢cer told Todd (1996, p.173) that he was looking for
borrowers that were “not hopeless.” This suggests that subsidized loans
may not be the appropriate strategy to reach the vulnerable poor, because
of their potentially higher default risk.
Microcredit’s success at reaching the poor is robust to introducing the in-
teraction term. Households below the poverty line have a 19 percent higher
chance of joining a microcredit program using the pooled data (Table 7,
column 5). This coe¢cient remains signi…cantly positive when we use alter-
native vulnerability measures instead of the baseline.
175 Conclusions
This paper uses panel data from two Bangladeshi villages to test if micro-
credit reaches the poor and vulnerable. This analysis is possible due to the
convenient timing of data collection. Households were extensively surveyed
in 1991 ¡ 92, when microcredit programs had only a small presence in the
study villages. Households were subsequently resurveyed in 1995 by which
time microcredit programs had …rmly established themselves.
This paper studies the interaction between microcredit selection and the
vulnerability of rural households. Vulnerability refers to the inability of
households to insure against idiosyncratic risks, and it is distinct from mea-
sures of consumption variability. It provides an example of how an anti-
poverty program which is successful at reaching the poor may exclude the
t h o s em o s ti nn e e do fa s s i s t a n c e ,t h ev u l n e r a b l ep o o r . T h ef o r c e st h a tm a k e
some poor households vulnerable may also make them greater risks for micro-
credit providers, however. This may explain why microcredit programs are
unsuccessful at reaching the vulnerable poor in these villages, and suggests
that subsidized credit may have limits as an anti-poverty strategy.17
Our vulnerability estimates for instance are based on monthly data col-
lected over 12 months. It would be interesting to see if estimates of house-
hold vulnerabilty are stable from year to year, or if some households are
more vulnerable to annual income shocks than to monthly shocks. It would
also be useful to know if microcredit’s success at reaching the vulnerable poor
depends on village characteristics, such as average village poverty or vulnera-
bility. How does the process of forming borrower groups a¤ect the likelihood
that the vulnerable poor join microcredit programs? Do relatively poor and
vulnerable households had higher default rates after they join microcredit
programs? We leave these questions for future research with more detailed
data sets.
17Subsidized microcredit may need to be supplemented with grants that reach the vul-
nerable poor. Rai and Sjöström (2001) show giving both grants and subsidized loans is
the e¢cient government intervention in a model where the poor are credit constrained.
186 Appendix: First Order Stochastic Domi-
nance tests
Suppose the cumulative distribution function of consumption for N (for non-
members) and M (for members) is given by FN(c) and FM(c) respectively.
Let C be the range of consumption for both these distributions First order
stochastic dominance of distribution N over M is equivalent to the condition:
FN(c) · FM(c);F N(ci) 6= FM(ci) for some i, 8c 2 C: (7)
Anderson’s (1996) test of …rst order stochastic dominance is quite straight-
forward to implement. The idea is to partition the combined sample for N
and M into k equal intervals and compute the empirical frequencies of the




nN;i=1 ;:::;k,w h e r e
xN
i is the number of observations in the N sample that fall in interval i,a n d
nN is the total number of observations in the N sample. Let If be a k £ k
lower-triangular matrix of ones. Since the cumulative distribution function
at a point j c a nb ec o m p u t e da sF(cj)=
Pj
i=1 pi, a test of condition (7)
translates into the following hypothesis test:
H0 : If(p
N ¡ p
M)=0 against H1 : If(p
N ¡ p
M) · 0
In particular, …rst order dominance of distribution N over M requires that
no element of the vector If(pN ¡pM) be signi…cantly greater than zero, while
at least one element is signi…cantly negative. The test is symmetric, so …rst
order dominance of distribution M over N requires that no element of the
vector If(pN ¡ pM) be signi…cantly negative, while at least one element is
signi…cantly positive. Finally, the test statistic If(pN ¡pM) is asymptotically
distributed as a N(0;I fVI 0
f) under the null hypothesis, where V can be
estimated using the empirical frequencies p of the combined sample. See
Anderson (1996) for the details.
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21TABLE 1 
SUMMARY STATISTICS*
VILLAGE AV ILLAGE B
(112 Households) (117 Households)
Mean Std. Dev. CV Mean Std. Dev. CV
Food Consumption 324.00 171.05 0.53 351.73 227.61 0.65
All Consumption 388.38 210.35 0.54 466.93 308.29 0.66
All Income 429.69 347.49 0.81 537.62 564.04 1.05
All Revenue 537.23 467.85 0.87 681.84 713.47 1.05
Medical Expenditures 36.06 50.37 1.40 57.56 77.20 1.34
Household Size 4.64 2.43 0.52 4.60 2.02 0.44
Age of HH Head 41.77 14.34 0.34 43.66 13.97 0.32
Number of children 1.66 1.30 0.78 1.57 1.20 0.77
Number of Old People 0.19 0.46 2.35 0.21 0.45 2.11
Agricultural Land 904.99 2750.02 3.04 766.45 1980.07 2.58
*All statistics are weighed to correctly reflect the proportion of female-headed households in the population.
*The first five variables are measured in units of 1992 taka per adult equivalent per month. Agricultural land is measured in decimals (100 decimals = 1 acre).
*Exchange Rate in 1992 was US $1=38 taka.TABLE 2
HOUSEHOLD CATEGORIES AND MICROCREDIT MEMBERSHIP
Village A Village B
Total Number of Sampled Households 112 117
   Landless (arable land <= 0.5 acres) 42 47
   Landed 70 70
   Female-headed  24 31
   Male-headed  88 86
   Uneducated Household Head 71 71
   Educated Household Head 41 46
   Members of Microcredit NGO 38 * 38 **
   Non-members 74 79
   Members of ASA 12 3
   Members of BRAC 16 19
   Members of Grameen 10 17
 *14 microcredit members were landless in 1992 in Village A. 
 **17 microcredit members were landless in 1992 in Village B.                                        
 In Village B, one HH is a member of both BRAC and Grameen.TABLE 3
POVERTY AND MICROCREDIT MEMBERSHIP
TEST OF STOCHASTIC DOMINANCE 
Pooled Data Village A Village B
Members minus  Members minus  Members minus 
Non-members (t-statistics) Non-members (t-statistics) Non-members (t-statistics)
0.0256 0.7547 -0.0154 -0.4090 0.0803 1.5172 *
0.0825 1.3334 0.0175 0.2315 0.1768 1.9994 **
0.1911 2.7245 ** 0.0665 0.6636 0.3131 3.1653 ***
0.1819 2.9260 *** 0.1228 1.3485 0.2004 2.1735 **
0.1081 2.0111 ** 0.0892 1.2023 0.1889 2.1811 **
0.0739 1.8470 ** 0.0183 0.3170 0.1005 1.4370 *
0.0535 1.7661 * 0.0417 1.2758 0.0762 1.4407 *
0.0533 2.0499 ** 0.0278 1.0369 0.0897 1.9051 **
0.0200 1.2411 0.0139 0.7298 0.0385 1.2249
The columns report the differences between the CDF of Consumption for Members and Non-members, at several points. Under the
null hypothesis that the two samples come from the same distribution, each term is distributed as a Student’s t with (here) 9 degrees 
of freedom.The t-statistics are in parentheses. The distribution for Members first order dominates that for Non-members if no term 
is significantly greater than zero while at least one is significantly negative. Likewise, dominance of Non-members
over Members requires than no term be significantly negative while at least one is significantly positive.
* Statistically significant at 10% level.
**Statistically significant at 5% level.
***Statistically significant at 1% level.TABLE 4
VULNERABILITY AND MICROCREDIT MEMBERSHIP
TEST OF STOCHASTIC DOMINANCE 
Pooled Data Village A Village B
Members minus  Members minus  Members minus 
Non-members (t-statistics) Non-members (t-statistics) Non-members (t-statistics)
-0.0200 -1.2411 -0.0139 -0.7298 -0.0256 -0.9957
-0.0204 -0.7392 -0.0015 -0.0448 -0.0250 -0.6214
-0.0160 -0.2794 -0.0154 -0.4090 -0.0209 -0.2652
0.0021 0.0409 -0.0395 -0.4634 -0.0965 -1.2233
0.0005 0.0191 0.1045 1.3033 -0.0405 -0.9241
0.0004 0.0155 0.0431 0.9472 -0.0270 -0.7477
-0.0130 -0.6993 0.0417 1.2758 -0.0398 -1.2679
-0.0132 -1.4080 * 0.0278 1.0369 -0.0263 -1.4389 *
-0.0132 -1.4080 * 0.0139 0.7298 -0.0263 -1.4389 *
The columns report the differences between the CDF of Vulnerability for Members and Non-members, at several points. Under the
null hypothesis that the two samples come from the same distribution, each term is distributed as a Student’s t with (here) 9 degrees 
of freedom.The t-statistics are in parentheses. The distribution for Members first order dominates that for Non-members if no term 
is significantly greater than zero while at least one is significantly negative. Likewise, dominance of Non-members
over Members requires than no term be significantly negative while at least one is significantly positive.
* Statistically significant at 10% level.
**Statistically significant at 5% level.
***Statistically significant at 1% level.1. Pooled Data
Vuln. (Baseline) -0.05 -0.04 -0.12 ** -0.14 ** 0.07
Vuln. (Truncated) 0.00 0.05 -0.14 ** -0.16 *** 0.04
Vuln. (Med. Exp) -0.05 -0.04 -0.13 ** -0.15 ** 0.07
Vuln. (Female) -0.04 -0.03 -0.12 ** -0.14 ** 0.08
Vuln. (Common) 0.02 0.06 -0.10 * -0.11 ** 0.03
Vuln. (Strong) 0.15 ** 0.11 ** -0.15 ** -0.16 *** 0.05
Vuln. (CRRA) 0.10 * 0.09 * -0.03 -0.03 0.05
C.V.(Cons) 1.00 0.82 *** 0.10 * 0.09 * -0.03
Var(log(Cons)) 1.00 0.02 -0.03 -0.02
Avg. All Cons. 1.00 0.94 *** -0.21 ***
Avg. Food Cons. 1.00 -0.20 ***
2. Village A
Vuln. (Baseline) -0.05 -0.04 0.01 0.03 -0.07
Vuln. (Truncated) 0.11 0.15 * -0.08 -0.06 -0.08
Vuln. (Med. Exp) -0.05 -0.03 0.01 0.03 -0.06
Vuln. (Female) -0.04 -0.01 0.03 0.05 -0.04
Vuln. (Common) 0.09 0.14 * -0.11 -0.10 -0.08
Vuln. (Strong) 0.17 ** 0.16 ** 0.00 0.03 -0.11
Vuln. (CRRA) 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.10 -0.10
C.V.(Cons) 1.00 0.82 *** 0.11 0.13 * -0.20 **
Var(log(Cons)) 1.00 -0.02 -0.03 -0.22 **
Avg. All Cons. 1.00 0.95 *** -0.12
Avg. Food Cons. 1.00 -0.11
3. Village B
Vuln. (Baseline) -0.05 -0.04 -0.21 ** -0.24 *** 0.16 **
Vuln. (Truncated) -0.10 -0.06 -0.21 ** -0.24 *** 0.17 **
Vuln. (Med. Exp) -0.05 -0.04 -0.22 *** -0.25 *** 0.16 **
Vuln. (Female) -0.04 -0.04 -0.22 *** -0.26 *** 0.17 **
Vuln. (Common) -0.04 0.00 -0.10 -0.12 * 0.13 *
Vuln. (Strong) 0.16 ** 0.09 -0.25 *** -0.26 *** 0.16 **
Vuln. (CRRA) 0.14 * 0.11 -0.10 -0.11 0.14 *
C.V.(Cons) 1.00 0.81 *** 0.09 0.06 0.14 *
Var(log(Cons)) 1.00 0.05 -0.03 0.17 **
Avg. All Cons. 1.00 0.95 *** -0.27 ***
Avg. Food Cons. 1.00 -0.28 ***
Each cell reports the correlation coefficient between the row and the column variables.
* Statistically significant at 10% level.
**Statistically significant at 5% level.
***Statistically significant at 1% level.
MC Member.
TABLE 5
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN VULNERABILITY, VARIABILITY, CONSUMPTION, 
AND MICROCREDIT MEMBERSHIP
C.V.(Cons.) V(log(Cons.)) All Cons. Food Cons.
MC Member.
C.V.(Cons.) V(log(Cons.)) All Cons. Food Cons. MC Member.
C.V.(Cons.) V(log(Cons.)) All Cons. Food Cons.1. Pooled Data
Vuln. (Baseline) 0.18 0.10 0.093 0.20 0.13 0.168
Vuln. (Truncated) 0.21 0.10 0.059 0.20 0.15 0.257
Vuln. (Med. Exp) 0.18 0.10 0.082 0.20 0.13 0.158
Vuln. (Female) 0.19 0.11 0.112 0.21 0.13 0.125
Vuln. (Common) 0.09 0.08 0.443 0.12 0.07 0.304
Vuln. (Strong) 0.25 0.18 0.058 0.25 0.21 0.249
Vuln. (CRRA) 0.19 0.14 0.153 0.19 0.16 0.256
C.V.(Cons) 0.43 0.52 0.004 0.46 0.47 0.336
Var(log(Cons)) 0.19 0.23 0.068 0.20 0.21 0.387
% Below Pov. Line 76.30 56.70 0.000
Avg. All Cons. 361.20 440.18 0.000
Avg. Food Cons. 287.55 346.59 0.000
2. Village A
Vuln. (Baseline) 0.11 0.12 0.454 0.08 0.13 0.214
Vuln. (Truncated) 0.17 0.11 0.287 0.09 0.18 0.163
Vuln. (Med. Exp) 0.11 0.12 0.458 0.08 0.13 0.228
Vuln. (Female) 0.11 0.14 0.371 0.09 0.13 0.313
Vuln. (Common) 0.11 0.08 0.398 0.03 0.13 0.145
Vuln. (Strong) 0.17 0.19 0.431 0.13 0.20 0.076
Vuln. (CRRA) 0.13 0.15 0.284 0.10 0.15 0.154
C.V.(Cons) 0.43 0.54 0.037 0.40 0.50 0.006
Var(log(Cons)) 0.20 0.23 0.171 0.16 0.23 0.006
% Below Pov. Line 78.90 65.30 0.057
Avg. All Cons. 353.78 389.80 0.084
Avg. Food Cons. 299.34 325.74 0.112
3. Village B
Vuln. (Baseline) 0.27 0.09 0.031 0.32 0.13 0.063
Vuln. (Truncated) 0.25 0.09 0.047 0.31 0.12 0.057
Vuln. (Med. Exp) 0.27 0.09 0.026 0.32 0.13 0.061
Vuln. (Female) 0.28 0.09 0.026 0.33 0.14 0.055
Vuln. (Common) 0.08 0.08 0.486 0.21 0.02 0.109
Vuln. (Strong) 0.35 0.17 0.012 0.37 0.22 0.084
Vuln. (CRRA) 0.26 0.13 0.039 0.28 0.17 0.081
C.V.(Cons) 0.43 0.52 0.029 0.51 0.44 0.060
Var(log(Cons)) 0.19 0.22 0.121 0.24 0.19 0.035
% Below Pov. Line 73.70 48.70 0.003
Avg. All Cons. 368.62 486.69 0.000
Avg. Food Cons. 275.76 365.83 0.000
Each cell reports the average of the row variable, by Poor (Non Poor) or by Member (Non Member).
A household is Poor if it is below the poverty line, and Non Poor otherwise.
The p-value refers to the test that the difference between Poor and Non Poor (or Member and Non Member) is equal to zero.
Non Mem. p - value
Poor
Poor Non Poor p - value Member
p - value
TABLE 6
Non Mem. p - value Non Poor p - value Member
VULNERABILITY, VARIABILITY, CONSUMPTION BY 
POVERTY STATUS AND MICROCREDIT MEMBERSHIP
Poor Non Poor p - value Member Non Mem.TABLE 7
PROBIT REGR. OF MICROCREDIT MEMBERSHIP ON VULNERABILITY, CONSUMPTION AND HH CHARACTERISTICS
POOLED DATA
Vulnerability 0.0693 (0.318) 0.0425 (0.544) 0.1059 (0.518) 0.0561 (0.403)
Avg. Cons. -0.0007 (0.000) -0.0007 (0.000) -0.0006 (0.004)
Agric. Land -0.00004 (0.127) -0.0000 (0.819)
Poor (Dummy) 0.1920 (0.007)
Vuln. x Poor -0.0620 (0.732)
Female headed 0.0489 (0.633)
Age of Head -0.0087 (0.009)
Household Size 0.0183 (0.550)
HH Structure 0.0012 (0.989)
Uneduc. Head 0.0598 (0.406)
# Old in HH 0.0103 (0.905)
# Children in HH -0.0296 (0.432)
Pseudo R^2
VILLAGE A
Vulnerability -0.0913 (0.498) -0.1023 (0.457) 0.2643 (0.250) -0.0237 (0.862)
Avg. Cons. -0.0006 (0.085) -0.0006 (0.090) -0.0006 (0.112)
Agric. Land -0.0000 (0.348) -0.0001 (0.141)
Poor (Dummy) 0.2148 (0.042)
Vuln. x Poor -0.4863 (0.081)
Female headed -0.1479 (0.355)
Age of Head -0.0035 (0.515)
Household Size 0.0623 (0.231)
HH Structure 0.3507 (0.043)
Uneduc. Head 0.0171 (0.873)
# Old in HH -0.1114 (0.429)
# Children in HH -0.0719 (0.265)
Pseudo R^2
VILLAGE B
Vulnerability 0.1378 (0.048) 0.1006 (0.144) -0.0263 (0.908) 0.0506 (0.441)
Avg. Cons. -0.0007 (0.003) -0.0006 (0.005) -0.0006 (0.029)
Agric. Land -0.0001 (0.219) 0.0000 (0.146)
Poor (Dummy) 0.1715 (0.068)
Vuln. x Poor 0.1672 (0.481)
Female headed 0.2853 (0.059)
Age of Head -0.0130 (0.003)
Household Size -0.0402 (0.323)
HH Structure -0.2812 (0.005)
Uneduc. Head 0.0692 (0.463)
# Old in HH 0.1114 (0.278)
# Children in HH 0.0234 (0.659)
Pseudo R^2
*The marginal effects dF/dx, evaluated at the sample mean, are reported here. P-values are reported in parentheses.




(1)* (2)* (3)* (4)*
(3)* (4)*
(1)* (2)* (3)* (4)* (5)* (6)*
0.0032 0.0453 0.0183 0.0465 0.0345 0.0914
0.0028 0.0209 0.0126 0.0241 0.0376 0.1383
0.0579 0.2517 0.0193 0.0653 0.0286 0.0763Figure 1a: CARA Utility































Figure 1b: CARA Utility































Figure 1c: CRRA Utility































Figure 1d: CRRA Utility
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FIGURE 2: Poverty, Vulnerability and Microcredit Membership
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